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INSULTS AND EPITHETS: ARE THEY
PROTECTED SPEECH?
Kent Greenawalt*

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a privilege to offer a lecture in this series named for Edward J. Bloustein. Not many lecture series honor sitting university presidents who deliver the first lecture in the series; but
President Bloustein is the very rare president whose long tenure
in office has been accompanied by continuing academic productivity.1 That achievement is remarkable.
When I tentatively chose this topic a year ago, I knew it involved the application of philosophical insights to serious practical questions, the kind of work that President Bloustein has done
so well. I also knew that the search for those aspects of human
dignity that warrant legal protection bears a connection to his
well-known writing on the tort right of privacy. What I did not
realize was that what I was attempting to carry out was actually
an approach to the first amendment that he recommended in his
lecture two years ago. 2 Considering Holmes and the clear-and• Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law. I should like
to thank the faculty and students of Rutgers School of Law for their thoughtful and helpful comments following the lecture.
1. On December 9, 1989, President Bloustein died after 17 years of service to the
University.
2. See Bloustein, Holmes: His First Amendment Theory and His Pragmatist Bent, 40
RUTGERS L. REV. 283 (1988).
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present danger test, he spoke of a "pragmatic approach to speech
... founded on how it truly worked, the role it played in human
experience . . . . What matters for a legal system is what words
do, not what they say . . . ." 3 These remarks strikingly capture
my own aspirations here.
Extremely harsh personal insults and epithets directed against
one's race, religion, ethnic origin, gender, .or sexual preference
pose a problem for democratic theory and practice. Should such
com:m,ents be forbidden because they lead to violence, because
they hurt, or because they contribute to domination and hostility? Or should they ·be part of a person's freedom to speak his or
her mind? Any country with a liberal democracy faces this dilemma. In the Uniteq. States, one forum for resolution is the judiciary, which applies the first amendment and analogous state constitutional provisions.
I shall look at insults and epithets in light of the different uses
of language. Thjs perspective hardly provides the last word about
what insults and epithets should be allowed, but it helps illuminate what is at stake. I begin with some brief general comments
about reasons for free speech and about uses of language. 4 I then
address the force of insults and epithets in various contexts. I
consider four claims about the damage they may do, as measured
against their value as expression. I then tie the analysis to existing and possible first amendment doctrine.~
II.

REASONS FOR FREE SPEECH AND USES OF LANGUAGE

The reasons for free speech are central for proper principles of
free speech. This is plainly true about legislative choice. Which
communications a legislature should leave free will depend on
why many communications should be free. Given language that is
as open-ended as that of our free speech and free press clauses,
3. Id. at 298-99. The lecture is mainly an interpretation of Holmes's approach, but
Bloustein leaves no doubt that he app~oves of the approach reflected in the language I
have quoted. Because it bears on my effort here, I should say I perceive a less close relation between Holmes's generally pragmatic approach and work done by philosophers of
language such as Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin than that suggested in the lecture.
4. These comments outline major themes of a book entitled K. GREENAWALT, SPEECH,
CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989). A discussion of reasons for free speech appears
in Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989).
5. My discussion of insults and epithets draws heavily on the chapters in Speech,
Crime, and the Uses of Language, supra note 4. On many subjects, they contain a more
. -detailed analysis and fuller citations.
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the reasons for free speech also bear closely on the scope of constitutional principles that guide courts.
We can divide the reasons to give speech more protection than
most other kinds of actions into consequential and nonconsequential reasons. Consequential reasons concern the good effects of a
practice. Despite some modern challenges to this traditional idea,
liberty of speech contributes to discovery of truth. Worries about
inequality among communicators and about people's tendency to
believe what is conventional and what serves irrational desires are
well founded. But the government's suppression of what it deems
to be false is hardly more conducive to growth in understanding
than wide liberty of expression. Such liberty also promotes accommodation of interests. Despite causing occasional divisiveness,
it can enhance social stability by reducing resentment. Freedom
of thought and expression promote individual autonomy and the
development of personality. Talk about one's ideas and feelings is
a vital emotional outlet. Conventions of free speech may help
teach a healthy tolerance of differences. In a liberal democracy,
citizens can perform a responsible political role only if they have
available a wide range of information and opinions. Free criticism
of government officials and policy is a strong check on the abuse
of political authority.
Nonconsequential reasons for liberties do not depend on what
happens after a person is restricted. The simple denial of liberty
is itself a wrong, and typically takes the form of an injustice or
denial of right. It is argued that, under our dominant social contract theory, most speech is within a private domain, not subject
to control by a government of limited powers. It is also claimed
that restricting speech neither treats citizens as autonomous and
rational nor accords them the dignity and equal status they warrant under a democratic government. I shall not today try to develop these claims and their reach. My judgment is that these arguments do not set clear standards for which communications
should be left free. Together with the consequential reasons, they
do help indicate what interferences with expression are most
troublesome, and they operate as counters in favor of freedom.
What communications do the reasons for free speech cover? In
a liberal democracy, the need is great for freedom of discourse
about public affairs, but the reasons for liberty of speech are
much broader, reaching all subjects of human concern. They
clearly cover general statements of fact, such as "rapid inflation
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causes social instability," and particular statements of fact, such
as "the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device yesterday." They
also cover general and particular assertions of value: "love is the
greatest good" and "you should not lie to your friend about your
grades." The reasons have much less force for assertions that the
speaker knows or believes to be false.
The reasons for free speech hardly apply at all to some sorts of
communications. Consider two people agreeing to commit a
crime. Their words of agreement represent commitments to action, not assertions of fact or value. Their words change the normative environment they inhabit, creating new obligations and
claims. The communications are situation-altering; they are much
more "action" than "expression." It should come as no surprise
that the punishment of ordinary conspiracies has rarely been
thought to raise problems of free speech. Orders, offers of agreement, and invitations, such as "just try to hit me," are similar to
agreements in their situation-altering character. I claim that these
communicative activities may be regulated essentially without
reference to principles of free speech. I make the same claim
about what I call manipulative threats and offers. Suppose Gertrude tells Claude that she will give him two thousand dollars if
he hires her or that she will disclose his criminal past if he does
not hire her. Her comment to Claude sets in play consequences
that would not otherwise occur; it is situation-altering. 6
Hovering between situation-altering utterances and ordinary
assertions of fact and value are what I call weak imperatives.
These "weak imperatives" are requests and encouragements that
do not sharply alter the listener's normative environment. If Gertrude says, "please hire Joseph" or "kill him, Claude," her immediate aim is to produce action, but she has not created new rights
or new obligations or new consequences of Claude's behavior.
Weak imperatives often indicate beliefs about values and facts
and cannot always be disentangled from them. They are covered
to a degree by a principle of free speech, but they may often be
prohibited when assertions of fact and value must be free.
Forgive this speedy, superficial sketch of some general views
about the uses of language and the reasons for free speech. It sets
6. On the other hand, if Gertrude merely warns Claude about what she would do in any
event, "I am going to divorce you if you don't spend more time at home," her words reveal
her natural response to circumstances and are like ordinary predictions about what will
happen in the future. Such warning threats are covered by a principle of free speech.
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the discussion of insults and epithets in a broader context.
III.

STRONG INSULTS AND GROUP EPITHETS

One feature of strong insults and epithets is that they tend to
shock those at whom they are directed and others who hear. They
are not expressions that are used in civil conversation or academic
discourse. A setting like this lecture presents a problem: how
much to risk offending by speaking the upsetting words and
phrases; how much to risk failure to come to terms with the real
issues by avoiding the words that shock. I shall indicate briefly
the sorts of remarks we are considering, and then use them sparingly. Many strong insults use coarse language in a highly derogatory way: "You are a stupid bastard," "cheating prick," "conniving bitch," "fucking whore." Others may be strong without any
single shocking word: "You are as yellow as the sun;" "your
mother must have discovered your father in a pigpen." Broadly,
epithets are words and phrases that attribute good, bad, or neutral qualities; but usually epithets are thought of as negative.
Some epithets denigrate on the basis of race, religion, ethnic origin, gender, or sexual preference. Among these are "wop," "kike,"
"spick," "Polack," "nigger," "pansy," "cunt," "honkey," "slanteyes," and perhaps "WASP."
This summary account allows me to make some obvious points.
Group epithets frequently strengthen other insulting words.
Group epithets and other words of insult often are spoken against
someone in a face-to-face encounter, but they are also used before
friendly audiences to put down outsiders. The strength of insults
and group epithets varies; much depends on tone of voice, context, and prior relationships. Saying just when words and phrases
pass beyond the bounds· of civil discourse at any moment in history is daunting. If the law is to restrict insults and group epithets, the task of categorizing which insults and group epithets
should be restricted is formidable.
IV.

INSULTS AND GROUP EPITHETS AS USES OF LANGUAGE

I turn now to how insults and epithets function as uses of language. The meaning of most insults and epithets amounts to
mixed assertions of facts and values. Words like "stupid" and
"cheating" have fairly definite content. The significance of group
epithets is much vaguer, but they call to mind whatever "nega-
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tive" qualities are associated with a group, qualities such as laziness, greed, dishonesty, stupidity, vulgarity. They also indicate a
harsh unfavorable judgment about members of the group. If insults and group epithets involve assertions of fact and value, then
does it follow that they are covered by a principle of freedom of
speech? Even if they are covered, their restriction might still be
warranted because these comments are too dangerous or too misleading; but should we recognize candidly that restriction is an
exception to the privilege speakers usually have to choose their
own terms to express their views? When insults and group epithets are spoken about people who are not present, they are indeed an extremely crude way to attribute characteristics and
render judgments. 7
In contrast, when insults and epithets are employed face-toface, the analysis of their use becomes more complicated. Indeed,
in such encounters, abusive remarks often approach closer to action and may even amount to situation-altering utterances. At the
extreme, social convention might establish that certain insults invite or even "demand" set responses: calling a man "chicken" to
his (ace might be understood as a challenge to fight. In that
event, uttering the insult would be a situation-altering utterance.
The phrase, "you are chicken," seems to have some fact and value
content, but if this just happens to be how one invites a fight, the
insult could be little more than a challenge. In any event, the situation-altering aspect matters more than any message about the
qualities of the person challenged. Probably no insults function
generally with this kind of precision in modern western societies,
but conventions among various subgroups may approximate this
kind of clarity. In settings where a person utters abusive words
that are understood by him and his listener to invite a fight, the
communication is dominantly situation-altering.
The circumstance is subtly different when a speaker, without
overtly inviting a fight, hopes to provoke such anger in the listener that a fight will ensue. 8 If the speaker tries to manipulate
7. This is true at least if the speaker's aim does not include having the comments relayed to those insulted.
8. For purposes of clarity, I am describing a sharp distinction that is clearly drawn and
perceptively analyzed in J. FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS 226-32 (1985). Often the two
aspects, conventional challenge and anger provocation, will be mixed in such a way that
even a thoughtful speaker aware of his own state of mind might have a hard time saying
which he is doing.
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the listener into fighting, his own expressive interests remain
slim; but for the listener the import of the insult differs now. He
is angered by the very bad things that have been said. His reaction is partly to the intense message of facts and values. 9
Often a speaker consciously sets out to wound and humiliate a
listener. He aims to make the other feel degraded and hated, and
chooses words to achieve that effect. 10 In what they accomplish,
insults of this sort are a form of psychic assault; they do not differ much from physical assaults, like slaps or pinches, that cause
no real physical hurt. Usually, the speaker believes the listener
possesses the characteristics that are indicated by his humiliating
and wounding remarks, 11 but the speaker selects the most abusive
form of expression to impose the maximum hurt. His aim diminishes the expressive importance of the words. He does not use
words to inform, nor is he really attempting to indicate his feelings. His aim is to wound, and the congruence of what he says
with his actual feelings is almost coincidental. 12
Many speakers who want to humiliate and wound would also
welcome a fight. But in many of the cruelest instances in which
abusive words are used, no fight is contemplated: white adults
shout epithets at black children walking to an integrated school;
strong men insult much smaller women. 13
For many persons, serious use of group epithets is regarded as
reprehensible and is quite rare; and serious use of strongly insulting words face-to-face occurs only during moments of high emo9. It has been suggested that "fighting words" trigger an automatic reaction. See J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.37, at 942-43 (3d ed. 1986);
Rutzick, 0/fensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8 (1974). No doubt these words can trigger intense responses that
reduce control, but many listeners must still be able to use some judgment about their
chances in a physical conflict, and are not likely to attack an abuser who is also pointing a
gun at them.
10. See generally Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Downs, Skokie Revisited:
Hate Group Speech and the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629 (1985). See
also J. FEINBERG, supra note 8, at 30, 89-91.
11. A speaker might not carry the attitudes the words imply. For example, a woman
with no prejudice against Italian-Americans who wished to hurt a particular Italian-American man who annoyed her might say "You wop," hoping that expression would be wounding to him.
12. On this point, Donald Downs writes, supra note 10, at 651, "[W)hen the primary
purpose of speech is not communication, but rather the infliction of harm, the law can no
longer construe any resulting harm as a secondary result."
13. See generally A. MONTAGU, THE ANATOMY OF SWEARING (1967).
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tion. Out of frustration and anger a person hurls words of intense
feeling that are also meant to wound; he does not expect responsive physical force but is not careful to avoid it. Abusive words in
these situations are a true barometer of feelings, and, as such,
have substantial importance as expression.
I have suggested that the circumstances in which people insult
each other vary a good deal. For some, the reasons for free speech
are more relevant than for others.
The remainder of my discussion is organized around the harms
that insults and group epithets can do. I review four main bases
for suppressing abusive language: (1) the danger of immediate violence; (2) psychological hurt that one is the object of abuse; (3)
general offense that such language is used; and (4) destructive
long term effects from the attitudes reinforced by abusive remarks. I comment about existing law and sensible legislative and
constitutional approaches.
V.

THE DANGER OF VIOLENT RESPONSE

Insults and group epithets can cause listeners to react with violence. I concentrate on the situation in which violence is used
against the speaker, and the person provoked to violence, or a
friend, is the immediate object of abuse. 14 Words highly likely to
provoke violence are ordinarily made criminal by breach of the
peace or disorderly conduct provisions. Under the Model Penal
Code's section on disorderly conduct, adopted in substance by
some jurisdictions, one must purposely or recklessly create a risk
of "public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm" by making "offensively coarse utterance, gesture or display" or by addressing "abusive language to any person present." 111 The Code also forbids
harassment; one commits a violation if, with a purpose to harass,
he "insults, taunts or challenges another in a manner likely to
provoke violent or disorderly response." 16
Much is unclear about how the first amendment applies to abusive remarks, but courts have steadily assumed that restriction is
permissible if the danger of responsive violence is great. The leading case was decided almost half a century ago. 17 Chaplinsky, a
14. Thus, I am putting aside circumstances in which abusive remarks lead others to act
violently against the victim of abuse.
15. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2(1)(b) (1962).
16. Id. § 250.4(2).
17. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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Jehovah's Witness, was annoying some people with his proselytizing. A city marshall warned him to "go slow." 18 Chaplinsky replied that the marshall was "a God damned racketeer" and "a
damned Fascist," and that the whole government of Rochester
was comprised of Fascists. 19 He was convicted under a statute
that forbade addressing "any offensive, derisive or annoying word
to any other person ... [or] call[ing] him by any offensive or
derisive name. . . ." 20 Despite the political nature of Chaplinsky's
remarks and their being addressed to an official, who presumably
was trained to restrain himself, the Supreme Court upheld the
conviction. It said:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace
.... [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 21

Reasoning that the state court had construed the statute only to
cover words that "men of common intelligence would understand
[to be] likely to cause an average addressee to fight," the Supreme Court decided that the statute was neither too vague nor
an undue impairment of liberty.
Two major developments have occurred since Chaplinsky. In
Cohen v. California, 22 the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a young man who wore a jacket saying "Fuck the Draft."
It stressed the emotive elements of communication and their constitutional protection. Given Cohen, 23 not all remarks that
amount to fighting words can be simply dismissed as lacking any
expressive value. The second development was a series of per
curiam opinions in which the Court invalidated statutes directed
18. State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 313 (1941).
19. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 571-72.
22. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
23. Of course, the Supreme Court might at some future time decide to abandon the
reasoning of Cohen.
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at offensive language as overbroad and vague. 2• The Court emphasized the lack of danger of immediate violence.
The prospect of immediate responsive violence is a proper basis
for restricting abusive words, but when is such restriction warranted? I shall focus on three aspects: the speaker's aims and understanding, the probability of violence, and the breadth of circumstances against which that probability is assessed.
I have suggested that when a speaker tries to provoke a fight,
his expressive interest is slight; his remarks represent a course of
action and may be punished. What if the speaker is not aiming to
start a fight, but understands, or should understand, that his
words may have that effect? The lowest appropriate standard of
culpability would require some understanding of danger by the
speaker. A speaker who was actually unaware that the sorts of
words he used might provoke violence should be protected. If persons are punished for speaking words they do not realize can
cause harm, open communication is threatened. As far as the
Constitution is concerned, it should be enough that the speaker
know the propensity of his words, even if, in his rage, he did not
consider their likely effect. Ignorance about the effect of words
should provide a constitutional defense, but a failure to bring
one's understanding to bear should not.
How likely should responsive violence have to be for remarks to
be punished on that basis? The Chaplinsky court wrote of "words
likely to cause an average addressee to fight." 211 This phrase has
ambiguities and is probably not to be taken literally. The first
ambiguity concerns the persons to be counted among potential
addressees: everyone, only people to whom a phrase really "applies," or all those likely to be angered by having the label applied to them? Someone of French origin reacts differently to being called a "Polack" than someone of Polish origin. Unless an
epithet is one to which most people react with great anger, 26 "average addressee" should include only those to whom the epithet
might apply. Another ambiguity is how an "average addressee" is
to be conceived. The Chaplinsky language reflects the propensity
24. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415
U.S. 130 (1974). See also Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
25. State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 320 (1941).
26. Sometimes it can be an insult to place a person in a category which both speaker
and listener know is literally inappropriate. Calling a boy or man "a little girl" may be a
way to impute cowardice or other "weakness."
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of courts to imagine male actors for most legal problems. Women,
as well as children and older people, are potential addressees for
most abusive phrases; but outside of quarrels among intimates,
abusive words are very often spoken by and to younger men, frequently after alcohol has been drunk. The average person to
whom insulting words are actually addressed may be more ready
to fight than the average potential addressee. Even if we focus on
those actually addressed, 27 probably no words now cause the average listener to respond with violence. In any event, that is too
stringent as a minimum constitutional test. Suppose a study
showed that twenty percent of listeners respond violently to certain words spoken in certain contexts. That should be enough to
restrict. The standard should be whether provoking violence is a
substantial probability.
Against what situations is the likelihood of violence to be
gauged? If this danger is the overriding reason for restraint, the
simplest approach is exemplified by the Model Penal Code: make
the likelihood of violence an inquiry into particular circumstances. This approach, however, is deeply troubling. Imagine
that in an area where few blacks live, 28 a twenty-five year old
white man of average size and strength waits for a bus with a
single black person, and the white directs a torrent of insults and
racial epithets at his black companion. Does it matter if the black
listener is (1) a strong twenty-year old man, (2) a seventy-yearold man on crutches, (3) a very small woman of fifty, or (4) a
child of nine? Only in the first setting is violence likely. Can the
same remark be punishable if directed at the one person able to
respond and constitutionally protected if directed at people not
able to match the speaker physically? Even asking this question
suggests two propositions. The first, to which I shall return, is
that proper reasons for restraint go beyond preventing immediate
violence. The second is that even if preventing such violence is
the main reason for restraint, some principle of "equalization of
victims" is called for. Inquiry should not concentrate on the per27. To quantify crudely why it matters which group counts: if 80 percent of young men
respond by fighting and only 20 percent of the much larger remaining pool of potential
addressees respond in that way, and if the abusive words are addressed to young men
more than the remaining pool together, then the average potential addressee (the whole
pool) would not fight, but the average actual addressee would fight.
28. I add this fact to reduce the possibility that a defenseless black might call on others
who are on, or waiting for, the next bus for retaliation.

298

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:287

ceived capacity of a particular victim to respond physically. 29 The
test should be whether remarks of that sort in that context would
cause many listeners to respond forcibly. Neither statutory nor
constitutional standards should require that a particular addressee be, or appear, likely to react violently.

VI.

WouNDING THE LISTENER WHo Is AausEo

Abusive words can be deeply wounding to their victims, but is
that a proper basis for criminal penalties or civil liability? Much
harsh language is a natural part of heated personal exchanges and
strong disagreements about ideas. Since few of us are able and
inclined to modulate our discourse to the magnitude of a subject,
the law must tolerate many words that hurt. The Supreme Court
has been right to invalidate criminal provisions that reach
broadly to offensive or opprobrious language.
If the use of any words can be punished because they wound, it
is only a small subcategory of all those that hurt, a category narrowed in terms of the speaker's aims, damage to the listener, the
way language is used, or some combination of these criteria. Suppose that four men think humiliating a Hispanic woman who is
standing alone would be "fun." They use their harshest words to
insult her gender and ethnic origin, and call her a "whore." Their
words wound deeply. Remarks whose dominant object is to hurt
and humiliate, not to assert facts or values, have very limited expressive value. Their harm can be serious. Viewed alone, behavior
like this should not be constitutionally protected against punishment.30 This conclusion fits the actual language of Chaplinsky,
which speaks of words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. " 31 But
line-drawing problems are severe. The speaker's motives may be
mixed, and separating an intent to humiliate from an honest but
crude statement of views is often difficult. A general criminal prohibition of abusive words designed to hurt and humiliate probably should be judged unconstitutional. 32 However, penalties are
proper when, as in my example, someone has initiated contact
with a person just to harass him or her; 33 they are also proper
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Subsequently, I consider the relevance of bystanders and their attitudes.
See, e.g., Downs, supra note 10; Delgado, supra note 10 (on civil liability).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis added).
See State v. Harrington, 67 Or. App. 608, 680 P.2d 666 (1984).
This behavior bears some resemblance to making a telephone call in order to harass.
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when abusive language accompanies a clear intent to intimidate
someone from exercising legally protected rights.
My conclusions about remarks that tend to provoke violence
have a crucial bearing here. I have recommended a principle of
equalization of victims. That principle, which would protect some
victims not likely to respond with physical force, implicitly recognizes the legitimacy of protecting against deep hurt. The test
whether words would cause many listeners to fight is a good test
for whether remarks have passed the boundaries of what innocent
citizens should be expected to tolerate. The hurt in a particular
instance may not correlate with a willingness to fight; indeed,
words may hurt the defenseless more than those who are able to
strike back. However, the sorts of comments about which some
listeners do fight are the ones that hurt the most. The propensity
to generate a violent response is partly a measure of the intensity
of hurt; this is a powerful reason why a listener's apparent capacity to fight back should not be an element of the speaker's crime.
If the particular victim's fighting capacity should be disregarded, so also should some other features of confrontational situations. The number of people supporting the abusive speaker and
the presence of bystanders who might help the victim should be
irrelevant, though these affect the likelihood of a physical clash.
A more subtle point concerns groups whose members are generally less likely to fight. Suppose women, or members of a particular ethnic group, are much less likely to fight than are men, or
members of other ethnic groups. That does not mean the listeners
are less hurt when insulted. I have proposed that the difference in
likely physical response is irrelevant for words that apply generally, but what of abusive words that apply peculiarly to the group
in question? Is equivalent abuse more protected if the broad class
of addressees is less likely to fight? The answer should be "no."
An ethnic slur should be treated like other ethnic slurs of similar
viciousness. 34 Calling a woman a "cunt" should be treated like
calling a man a "prick." When the question is asked if words "of
this sort" would lead many addressees to fight, the inquiry about
the words should abstract from the inclinations to fight of the
particular class abused.
It has been assumed that this behavior is punishable, even though the prospect of immediate violence is absent.
34. I do not underestimate how difficult it may be to decide what slurs are similarly
vicious.

300

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:287

Words that wound may lead to civil recovery in place of, or in
addition to, criminal penalties. A standard for civil damages can
be vaguer than is acceptable for criminal liability. Presently, the
main vehicle for recovery in tort is infliction of emotional distress. 311 That tort requires extremely outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress. When these conditions are met, liability
for abusive words is appropriate. However, an absolute privilege
is needed for some communications with general public significance, as the Supreme Court has held for parodies of important
public figures. 36
Do some abusive expressions hurt so generally in face-to-face
conversations that they should be singled out as actionable? The
most obvious candidates are racial and ethnic epithets and slurs.
Similar remarks directed at religion, sexual preference, and gender might also be reached. Even for race and ethnicity, determining which expressions should be treated as wrongful is worrisome.
One problem is that those secure in a favored status can accept
denigrating terms that apply to their privileged position with less
distress than can those who know the terms reflect a wide dislike
of their group. "Honkey" hurts a lot less than "nigger," and
"WASP" hurts a lot less than "kike." 37 Despite these line-drawing difficulties, a substantial argument exists for a special rule allowing recovery when speakers seriously try to injure and demean
with racial and ethnic insults. 38
VII.

OFFENSIVENESS

The third possible basis for restricting strong insults and group
epithets is "general offensiveness." When the words and phrases I
have mentioned are seriously used, they shock. They disturb people who are not the subject of abuse and they do so regardless of
their message. However, determining what words are acceptable
depends heavily on social context; and conventional restraints on
language have loosened considerably in the last few decades. In
the United States, no words or expressions should be illegal simply because they offend those who hear them. 39 Someone's dis35. See generally Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words Intended
to Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (1985).
36. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
37. See Delgado, supra note 10, at 180.
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 2-30 (1984); Rutzick, supra
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quiet at listening to objectionable language is not nearly as great
as his distress that he or his loved ones are the direct object of
humiliating language. People who strongly wish not to be exposed
to coarse language should avoid settings where use of that language is likely. In certain more formal settings, constraints on use
of language are appropriate. Lawyers in court may not curse opposing counsel or judges, because curses are destructive of civility
in court proceedings. A more debatable situation is a public meeting at which citizens are free to speak. If other citizens need to
attend the meeting, flagrantly abusive language is directed toward
a kind of captive audience and it may undermine the attempt to
maintain reasoned discourse. However, it is arguable that citizens
participating in open meetings should probably have the freedom
of more informal settings.
Cohen v. California" 0 and other cases indicate that the Constitution does not permit prohibition based on the offensiveness of
language alone. However, the Supreme Court supposes that offense can be the basis for restriction in limited settings. It has
upheld discipline of a high school student for offensive remarks at
a school assembly41 and federal restrictions on the broadcast of
coarse words on daytime radio. 42 Both decisions are highly questionable. People are free to switch their dials and few children
listen to daytime radio; the school remarks were part of a campaign speech that exceeded good taste but was neither shockingly
abusive nor extremely coarse. 43 Nevertheless, the Court's general
note 9, at 27. For an elaborate and sophisticated account of varieties of offensiveness and
the circumstances in which offensive behavior may properly be punished in a liberal society, see J. FEINBERG, supra note 8, at 1-96.
40. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
41. Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, (1986).
42. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
43. The student gave the following speech at a high school assembly in support of a
candidate for student government office:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his
character is firm-but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel,
is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll
take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he
drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax-, for each and
every one of you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and
the best our high school can be.
Bethel School Dist., 478 U.S. at 687, (Brennan, J., concurring).
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position that there should be regulation in some narrow settings
is sound.
VIII.

LONG-TERM HARMS

The fourth reason for suppressing strong insults and group epithets is the avoidance of long-term harms. I shall say a brief word
about the quality of public discourse before concentrating on
harms that relate to social resentment and inequality. Some have
argued that Cohen v. California gave insufficient weight to maintaining a civil quality to public discourse. 44 Coarseness and abuse
may negatively affect reasoned discourse, but the government
should not be in the business generally of setting standards for
acceptable speech:l 11 It is no coincidence that the less privileged
and more radical are those who often use words and phrases that
might be judged to impair civil discourse. Drawing distinctions
between what is civil and what is not is difficult, and government
control of the terms of discussion should not sanitize expressions
of outrage.
The more troubling question involves the long-term effects of
insults and epithets that reinforce feelings of prejudice and inferiority and contribute to social patterns of domination. Although
repetition of some personal insults, such as "you fat slob," can
undermine self-esteem, the effect of most such insults is contained and dissipates fairly quickly. Epithets and more elaborate
slurs that reflect stereotypes about race, ethnic group, religion,
sexual preference, and gender may cause continuing hostility and
psychological damage. The harms need not depend on whether
listeners are the objects of the epithets or slurs. All-male conversations in which women are denigrated can support male
prejudices, and women's feelings of resentment and inferiority
may derive from knowing how they are talked about as well as
reacting to how they are talked to. If one focuses on these longrun harms, the particular audience is not of primary importance;
laws in other countries that are specifically directed against racial, ethnic, and religious epithets and slurs• 6 do not make the
44, See, e.g., A.

BICKEL, MORALITY OF CONSENT 72-73 (1975).
45. See, e.g., Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor Bickel, Justice
Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283.
46. See generally E. BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 163-65 (1985); L. BOLLINGER, THE
TOLERANT SocIETY 38-39 (1986); Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 281, 283-84; Note, A Communitar-
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audience critical.
Whether a law of this type would be held unconstitutional in
the United States is very dubious. In Beauharnais v. Illinois;" in
1952, the Supreme Court did uphold a conviction under a law
that forbade publications portraying "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color,
creed or religion [in a way that exposes those citizens] to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of
the peace or riots." 48 Beauharnais had organized distribution of a
leaflet asking city officials to resist the invasion of the Negro and
warning that if "the need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then the aggressions, ... rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro, surely will." 49 The Court assimilated this speech to group
libel, instances in which something defamatory is said about a
small group in such a way that the damaging remark falls on
members of the group: for example, "the [fifteen member] firm of
Mix and Nix is a bunch of crooks." 110 The Court mentioned the
danger of racial riots which a legislature might reasonably think is
made more likely by racist speech. 111 In subsequent years, the
ian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV. L. REV. 682, 689-94 (1988). In a Public Order
Act of 1986, the British Parliament amended previous enactments to provide that "[a)
person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays any written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting is guilty . . . if (a) he intends
thereby to stir up racial hatred, or (b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred
is likely to be stirred up thereby." Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, § 18. A similar standard
governs publication or distribution of material, public performance or recording of plays,
and radio and television broadcasts. Id. §§ 19-22. For the Federal Republic of Germany,
relevant statutes and interpretations, as well as recent legislative reform, are carefully described in Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the "Auschwitz"-and Other-"Lies," 85 MICH. L. REV. 277 (1986). Although some foreign legislation seems very broad to American eyes, Lee Bollinger has observed that other countries
are able to distinguish racist rhetoric from other speech: "It seems a significant piece of
corroborating evidence that virtually every other western democracy does draw such a distinction in their [sic] law; the United States stands virtually alone in the degree to which
it has decided legally to tolerate racist rhetoric." See L. BOLLINGER, supra, at 8.
47. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
48. Id. at 251.
49. Id. at 252.
50. See generally Note, Group Defamation: Five Guiding Factors, 64 TEX. L. REV. 591
(1985).
51. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 259. The Court sustained the refusal of the Illinois courts
to entertain truth as a defense, on the ground that a state might, and did, require "good
motives" and "justifiable ends" as well as truth, and if these requisites could not be satisfied the court did not need to consider evidence of truth. Id.
This aspect of the Court's opinion is unsatisfying, because the trial court did not indi-
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Court's protection of civil libel, the Cohen case, and invalidations
of breach of the peace and disorderly conduct statutes that lacked
reference to immediate danger of violence, .have largely undermined the authority of Beauharnais. The case has occasionally
been cited in peripheral contexts, but the prevailing assumption
has been that a statute as broad as that one from Illinois would
not stand, and that a publication like the one in that case would
be protected. In cases that arose out of the intense controversy
over whether Nazis might march in uniform in Skokie, a city inhabited by many Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, appellate
judges acted on these premises, striking down ordinances
designed to keep the Nazis out and indicating that a Nazi march
could not be altogether foreclosed. 112
During the last two decades the Supreme Court has emphasized that discrimination among communications on the basis of
content is constitutionally suspect. When a law is directed at
group epithets and slurs, words are made illegal because they
place people in certain categories and are critical of members of
those categories. This is certainly content discrimination. It may
be said in response that much of the harm of these abusive words
derives from nonconscious response to their force, not from conscious consideration of the overall message. 53 Nevertheless, if a
law forbids comments made generally or to third persons about
members of groups, and it covers the "ordinary" language of the
publication in Beauharnais as well as harsh epithets, what is being suppressed really is a message whose content and intensity is
judged hurtful and obnoxious. This language cannot be characterized as "low value" speech, except by virtue of a judgment about
its substantive message.
Some proponents of laws of this type have argued that if such
speech is tolerated, the government implicitly endorses a message
that is contrary to our fundamental values. 114 That is not so. The
government permits all kinds of speech contrary to our constitutional values; that is an aspect of freedom of speech. The governcate that it would consider truth if Beauharnais also made a showing of "good motives"
and "justifiable ends." I assume that courts cannot reject motives and ends as unjustifiable because they disapprove of the political program that is urged.
52. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978);
see also D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 191-92 (1986).
53. Also, people are left free to express any facts or values about members of the group
in less obnoxious words.
54. See, e.g., Note, supra note 46, at 690-91.
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ment can promote equality by its own actions, by education and
advocacy, by regulating actions other than speech. Allowing racist
rhetoric does not show support of racism. It is true that in a society where less privileged members of minorities may identify the
majority with the government, government passivity may be perceived as support. But more emphasis on the government's direct
commitment to positive values of equality is a better way to show
support than silencing speakers.
Many countries have reasonably concluded that suppression of
messages of race and ethnic hate is warranted, at some cost to
free speech, because values of equality and dignity are so central
and so vulnerable. 1111 The issue is close, but my own judgment coincides with the prevailing academic assumption that a law like
that in Beauharnais should be held unconstitutional. Part of the
reason is the difficulty in seeing how the line of permissible restriction would be drawn once the harm of messages was treated
as a proper basis for suppression.
One conceivable way to meet this objection to restricting
messages of fact and value would be to forbid only "false" speech
about members of groups. 116 Such speech would lack "full value"
because of falsity, and prohibiting it would not open the door for
broad prohibitions of speech. Unfortunately, aiming at false
speech of this kind would either be ineffectual or dangerous. Suppose that the "false" remarks to be criminalized were those that
asserted definite facts about members of groups that were demonstrably false and were known to be false by those making the
assertions, for example, "Every single black person in this country
scores lower on standard intelligence tests than the worst scoring
white person." Punishing those who make such false assertions
would have a very slight effect on hate literature. To have any
bite, the law's coverage of punishable false statements would have
to include matters of opinion or much vaguer and ambiguous factual assertions. As far as free speech is concerned, opinions may
not be labeled true or false. With respect to vague factual assertions, trials would afford merchants of hate an opportunity to indicate their meanings in full detail, using that public forum to
present damaging facts about the group they despise as un-

55. See supra note 46.
56. See, e.g., Note, supra note 46.
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sympathetically as possible. t1 7 Two conclusions emerge. If falsity is
an aspect of criminal liability, people should be punishable only
for clear assertions of fact, and much vague scurrilous comment
about groups would remain unpunishable. Trials about truth
could easily do much more damage than the original communications. Whatever the constitutional status of a law precisely limited to false assertions of fact, adopting such a law would be
senseless.
If racial and ethnic epithets and slurs are to be made illegal by
separate legal standards, the focus should be on face-to-face encounters, targeted vilification aimed at members of the audience. 58 As to these, expressive value is slight, because the aim is
to wound and humiliate, or to start a fight. Since fighting words
are already punishable and the tort of extreme emotional distress
is available, what would be the significance of separate provisions
for the language of group vilification? They could stand as symbolic statements that such language is peculiarly at odds with our
constitutional values; and they could relieve prosecutors, or plaintiffs, from having to establish all the requisites of a more general
offense or tort. t1 9
Some lesser showing of immediate injury is appropriate for
words that historically have inflicted grave humiliations and damage to ideals of equality and continue to do so. Of course, special
57. Beauharnais is instructive as to these difficulties. The leaflet in question asserted,
among other things, that "if the need to prevent being mongrelized by the Negro did not
unite white people, the rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the Negro, surely
will." 343 U.S. 250, 252 (1952). The desirability of white people uniting is a matter of
opinion; the likelihood that that will happen is a prediction of vague and uncertain future
facts that cannot be punished. Exactly what Negroes are said to be doing to bring about
"mongrelization" is much too unclear to amount to a punishable assertion of facts. That
leaves the statement about the "rapes, robberies," et cetera. What exactly is being claimed
here: that all Negroes engage in these bad acts, that most do, that a higher proportion of
Negroes than whites do? The first proposition is absurd and the second is probably demonstrably false, but Beauharnais might say at his trial: "Well, all I meant factually is
that the percentages are a lot higher among Negroes and that for this reason, the safety of
neighborhoods will deteriorate if Negroes move in." I do not know what was true in Chicago around 1950, but we do know that Beauharnais offered to prove truth, and that
around 1989, at least judged by convictions, the percentage of blacks who commit many
serious crimes is higher than the percentage of whites who do so.
58. See Delgado, supra note 10; Downs, supra note 10.
59. See Delgado, supra note 10, at 151-57. For criminal liability, I am inclined to think
that either a purpose to initiate contact in order to humiliate or an attempt to intimidate
should be constitutionally required. That is, punishment should not be allowed if during a
heated conversation a person decides to wound another with such remarks, unless the remarks also are of a sort that often lead to violence.
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treatment for class-based insults in face-to-face settings would be
a modest exception to "content neutrality," but one that is warranted in light of the values involved.
In closing, I want briefly to consider the import of an ideal of
civic courage, an ideal eloquently propounded by Justice Brandeis, for strong insults and group epithets. 60 If a principle of free
speech assumes that people are hardy or aims to help them become so, perhaps coarse and even hurtful comments should be
protected in the rough and tumble of vigorous dialogue. But
group epithets and slurs designed to wound listeners are another
matter. Being impervious to epithets when one is a member of a
privileged majority is much easier than when one belongs to a reviled minority, and a general encouragement of civic courage may
be more likely if targeted racial and religious abuse is not allowed.
Even "courageous citizens" should not be expected to swallow
such abuse without deep hurt, and being the victim of such abuse
may not contribute to hardiness in ways that count positively for
a democratic society.

60. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

